The idea that the law should not assign probative weight to items of information, or degrees of credibility to its bearers, is widely extolled as one of the cornerstones of enlightened factfinding in adjudication. 1 Despite momentous changes that have occurred in the administration ofjustice in this century, the idea continues to command widespread allegiance -especially in the area of criminal procedure. This is not to say, however, that no challenges appeared to the idea in recent years. The first challenge stems from the increased employment over the past few decades of exclusionary rules of evidence. Their application generates frequently overlooked strains with the factfinder's freedom in analyzing evidence. The second challenge is posed by socio-cultural ramifications of technological and scientific advances made in this century. Although for the most part only latent, this second challenge is potentially quite serious and far-reaching. As we near the next millennium, the question is thus worth asking whether free proof is still as firmly entrenched in justice systems as it appears on the surface of things -even in the stronghold of free proof rhetoric, that is, iIi criminal procedure.
An initial difficulty in addressing this question is that attitudes toward the relation of the law to the analysis of evidence are not exactly alike in the Anglo-American and continental European legal traditions. Failure to take account of these differences is capable of muddling clarity of thought on the subject. To remedy this initial difficulty, I begin by outlining different approaches to free proof in the two branches of the Western legal tradition.
I. CONTINENTAL AND COMMON LAw ATTITUDES
As is well known, continental views on free proof evolved against the background of criticism of ancien regime's evidence law at the time of the French Revolution. The main object of this criticism were rules of Roman-canon provenance that assigned weight to specified MIRJAN DAMASKA is Ford Foundation Professor of Comparative and Foreign Law, Yale Law School.
1. For civil law systems, see Rudolf Schlesinger, et al., Comparative Law 425 (5th ed. 1988) . To some commentators, free evaluation of evidence is an "irreversible stage" in the evolution of proof systems. See Massimo Nobill, II Principio del Libero Convincimento del Giudice 5-6 (1974) .
